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Abstract 
Online forms of harassment, stalking and bullying on social network and communication 
platforms are now arguably wide-spread and subject to regular media coverage. As these 
provision continue to attract millions of users, generating significant volumes of traffic, 
regulating abuse and effectively reprimanding those who are involved in it, is a difficult and 
sometimes impossible task. This article collates information acquired from 22 popular social 
network and communication platforms in order to identify current regulatory gaps. Terms of 
service and privacy policies are reviewed to assess existing practices of data retention to 
evaluate the feasibility of law enforcement officials tracking those whose actions breach the 
law. For each provision, account sign-up processes are evaluated and policies for retaining 
Internet Protocol logs and user account information are assessed along with the availability 
of account preservation orders. Finally, recommendations are offered for improving current 
approaches to regulating social network crime and online offender tracking.  
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1 Introduction 
Online platforms have now revolutionised modern day communication. However, in light of 
recent global events, social media has now become a platform for those to voice both 
positive and negative sentiment, requiring greater regulation by both the social networking 
sites themselves and the police (Awan, 2016).  With a reported 2.3 billion social network 
users worldwide (Statista, 2016), the regulation of user behaviour on these platforms is a 
difficult task. In 2015, Vodafone and YouGov surveyed around 5,000 teenagers across 11 
countries, where 41% of respondents admitted to feeling depressed or helpless from acts of 
cyberbullying and a further 18% feeling suicidal (Vodafone, 2015). In addition, a quarter of 
those surveyed had actively closed their social media accounts due to acts of cyberbullying 
(Vodafone, 2015). Similarly, the Association of School and College Leaders (2016) reported 
that 41% of the school leaders surveyed reported an increase in acts of students being 
cyberbullied. In 2016, anti-bullying charity Ditch the Label (2016) surveyed 8,850 persons 
aged 12-20, with 6 out of 10 of those reported to have been bullied, indicating that they had 
experienced this online. Despite the many benefits offered by online communication and 
social networks, a darker side is also apparent. 
 
Social networks and online forms of communication are frequently identified as problems in 
the battle against online harassment and abuse. In 2014, ‘a total of 38 out of 45 police forces 
saw a rise in the number of crime reports that involved Facebook’ (Birchley, 2015) with ‘the 
Metropolitan Police, receiving 1,207 crime reports which mentioned Facebook, up from 935 
in 2013 and 997 in 2012’ (Evans, 2015). Further Evans (2015) reports that over ‘16,000 
alleged crimes involving Facebook and Twitter were reported’ across all United Kingdom 
(UK) police forces for the period of 2014/15. The Twitter platform is regularly subject to 
scrutiny due to the volume of trolling (an act of posting ‘inflammatory or inappropriate 
messages or comments online for the purpose of upsetting other users and provoking a 
response’ (Dictionary.com, 2016)) which occurs (BBC News, 2016a) and the service has 
been criticised for failing to be proactive in regulating and removing offending content, such 
as that posted by the extremist cleric Anjem Choudary (BBC News, 2016b). Other examples 
of social network abuse include the 2011 England riots where such provision were used to 
organise mass congregations and crime, with Williams et al. (2013) suggesting that at the 
time, police were ill-equipped to deal with analysing this content. Yet it remains questionable 
as to whether some five years later, law enforcement are in a better position to tackle these 
issues.   
 
Reports of sexist and misogynistic comments targetting those on Youtube and Twitch have 
also received media coverage (BBC News, 2016c), yet such incidents form merely a small 
part of a far greater issue. Frequently high-profile personalities are targeted, where recent 
examples include Stephen Fry, Jennifer Lawrence, Matt Lucas and Sinead O’Connor, 
prompting their exit from such platforms (Cohen, 2014). In addition, attacks upon Sara 
Payne, the mother of murdered school girl Sarah Payne, and Zelda Williams, the daughter of 
the now deceased Robin Williams show an altogether more sinister side of the harassment 
which can be suffered online (Cohen, 2014). These instances form only a small subset of the 
overall volume of abuse which is experienced by everyday individuals. Acts of online abuse 
can now be considered relatively common and form part of a greater issue and debate 
surrounding the need for greater regulation of social networks, a point alluded to in the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2016) report into Radicalisation.     
   
Social media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their 
sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have 
become the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the 
hundreds of millions in revenues generated from billions of people using 
their products needs to be accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility 
and ownership for the impact that extremist material on their sites is having 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2016, p.34). 
     
Hate crime is also becoming an increasing issue for social network platforms. In the wake of 
the UK’s vote to leave the European Union (commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’), MP Andy 
Burnham highlighted a subsequent fivefold increase ‘in race hate comments on social media 
channels’ (HC Deb, 2016). This is backed by GLA Conservatives’s (2015) survey which 
reported 68% of the 308 individuals reviewed had encountered hate crime online. The 
Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC) (2016) states that currently social media is 
providing offenders with a ‘veil of anonymity’ which is prohibiting effective regulation of their 
conduct, and have recently acquired funding from the Home Office Police Innovation Fund 
(PIF) to develop an online hate crime hub (MOPAC, 2016).  
 
In any of the aforementioned acts, where forms on online content overstep the mark and fall 
foul of domestic or international legislation, the identification on an offender is key to the 
effective regulation of illegal behaviour. Studies have shown online environments can ‘lower 
behavioral inhibitions’, encouraging disclosures and derogatory actions (Suler, 2004; 
Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012), yet where an account holder cannot be identified there is a 
lack of accountability for their conduct. This provides an issue for law enforcement when 
trying to regulate and apprehend social network offenders, potentially leaving any victims 
vulnerable for sustained online abuse. This article examines the terms of service, privacy 
policies and functionality of 22 social network and communication provision in an effort to 
establish the current feasibility of tracking offenders who post content on these platforms in 
breach of both policy and law. Account sign-up processes are evaluated along with policies 
for the retention of data which could be used to identify those in breach. Finally, conclusions 
and recommendations are drawn.  
 
2 Regulatory problems 
Guidelines supporting those subject to cyberbullying and online harassment on social 
networks exist on various organisation portals designed to support those subject to these 
acts. Childline (2016) identify Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Instant messaging (IM), 
Snapchat, ASKfm and Tumblr, and provide guidance for those subject to abuse on these 
platforms and how to block and report it. The charity ‘Family Lives’ (2016) provides guidance 
on dealing with cyberbullying on Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Whatsapp, Snapchat and 
Instagram. Other charities offering similar advice and resources include The CyberSmile 
Foundation (2016) and the NSPCC (2016). Policing social media content is notoriously 
difficult and arguably, we are yet to see effective forms of regulation in force across many 
platforms. The Select Committee on Communications’s Report (2014) indicated that this is 
due to the fact that ‘there is no consistent attitude taken by website operators: some require 
the use of real names (Facebook, although they do not actively confirm users' identities); 
some allow anonymity but challenge impersonation (Twitter) and others allow absolute 
anonymity’.   
 
The volume of users combined with large quantities of network traffic continue to pose 
issues (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). Techniques for  regulating online social network content 
typically fall within one of two categories, proactive or reactive. Proactive measures address 
content before and as it happens and attempt to prevent its appearance on a given platform 
in the first instance. Online filters and keyword matching are methods for highlighting posts 
of a particular type and prevent certain forms of language from being submitted (Bekkers et 
al., 2013). Yet the speed of linguistic developments mean that these methods can only serve 
a limited purpose and may quickly become ineffective as new offensive terms or phrases are 
developed or ways to circumvent their use  are discovered (through the use of punctuation, 
special symbols to break up the plain text meaning of a word). The application of sentiment 
analysis has also been offered as a way of improving the identification of offending 
messages (Ceron et al., 2014). Social media platforms have also taken steps to encourage 
users to be proactive about reporting incidents online as opposed to waiting for a response 
from the network itself, introducing the notion of self-policing and user-regulation. Facebook 
have an inbuilt reporting system (Facebook, 2016e) with similar process witnessed on other 
platforms such as Twitter (2016d) and Instagram (2016d). Yet despite such methods, it 
remains arguable that the complete prevention of abuse is unachievable. Regardless of 
form, where content is posted that reaches it’s intended target (i.e. a victim’s account) in 
breach of regulations, a reactive response must be formed in order to reprimand those 
responsible.  
 
Where message content breaches platform policies or legislation, it may be deemed 
necessary to identify and prosecute the individual responsible for the post. This is 
particularly necessary in numerous cases including those of online harassment and 
threatening behaviour where in the UK, the circumstances of the case satisfy the test 
defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). The test is 
twofold where first evidential sufficiency must be achieved (‘a prosecutor must be satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction’), before 
consideration must be given as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest. Before this 
test can be implemented, consideration must be given as to whether there is sufficient 
evidence available allowing the physical poster of any message content to be identified in 
the first instance. This can be a difficult process, and one where success is subject to the 
governance and guidelines of the platform from which the abusive content took place. In 
many circumstances, there is insufficient data available to identify account holders, hindering 
effective law enforcement investigation. In absence of the ability to identify an offender, there 
can often be no legal case to proceed with. On many platforms, regulatory issues exist right 
from the account creation process, where fake information can often be used to open an 
account (Barrett, 2016), providing a starting point for analysis in this article. 
 
2.1 Implementing effective regulatory measures for identifying account holders 
In simple terms, effective regulatory measures on social networks allow for the assessment 
and evaluation of posted content and the enactment of measures to reprimand those who 
breach both the social media platform terms of use or legal authority. In order to do this, a 
social media platform should be able to hold its users to account for the content they post, 
where essentially they must be identifiable when behavioural breaches occur. To achieve 
this, social media networks have three current options for account validation, namely direct, 
indirect and metadata validation: 
 
Direct validation: Direct validation requires the user to submit accurately their 
name and identifying information during the creation of their account, and, 
being able to attribute any posted content to these details. The problem here 
relates to the term ‘accurate’ and the fact that as already highlighted, most 
social media networks do not accurately validate user input. Typically, social 
network signup procedures require users to input criteria which include name, 
age and email address. However there is generally no processes in place to 
accurately authenticate this content. Despite so-called ‘real-name’ policies, 
seen with platforms such as Google+ (however, their policy was subsequently 
rescinded in 2014 (Vincent, 2014)) and Facebook (2016e), name data is not 
authenticated. As a result, account name data cannot be relied upon as a 
source of offender identifiable information for law enforcement in some cases, 
which has lead to an abundance of unattributable accounts created solely for 
purposes such as trolling. The implementation of an effective name validation 
process would be onerous and require acts similar to those seen in online 
monetary transactions or where documentary proof of identity can be captured 
and verified. When considering that many of the social network provisions 
seek to attract users via a no-fuss sign-up process to prevent users from 
disengaging, it is unlikely that these type of verification processes will ever be 
implemented. Similar concerns surround the use of a valid email address (see 
Section 3.2 for an analysis of sign-up processes). 
 
Indirect Validation: Indirect validation methods may be used to identify an 
account holder based on their actions and is subject to the behaviour of the 
offender. For example, those users who have their identity validated indirectly 
include those who post or send identifiable message content through 
disclosure of personal information or media. This can include for example, the 
posting of imagery where an offender is present and can be identified or 
textual content disclosing identifiable details; these could be potentially 
accidental disclosures. The problem faced here is that those who create 
accounts solely for the purpose of abuse are likely to omit the inclusion of 
personally identifiable content and therefore the use of indirect validation 
methods is limited.  
 
Metadata Validation: Metadata validation surrounds the attributing of an 
account to an individual from the metadata left behind by their interaction with 
the service. The effectiveness of this validation form is often dependant on the 
service provider and their policies regarding the collection and retention of 
data, and, their willingness to co-operate with law enforcement. Typically 
relevant metadata could include: 
 
1. Internet Protocol (IP) Address: IP information can (not always, 
subject to spoofing) be used to identify an internet connection 
from which offending communications were made, and 
potentially their location.  
2. Device information: This includes information such as the user's 
device type and telephone number if they are accessing 
services via a mobile device. 
3. Geolocational data relating to the poster of content.  
 
The above information can be classed as ‘log data’ and is subject to the 
following limitations. 
 
1. Log retention: In regards to metadata account validation, the 
retention of logged data poses a number of issues. The first issue 
comes from the assumption that relevant data is stored in the first 
instance. In cases where no appropriate logs are retained, account 
identification via metadata is not feasible, creating a significant 
issue, as account usage metadata is arguably the most likely 
source of data which is of use to law enforcement. Even when log 
data is retained, the length of time is critical, where sufficient time 
must be provided to ensure the necessary legal authority is sought 
in order to obtain the data. Given that many platforms witness 
significant volumes of traffic, a factor impacting the length of time 
data is retained is often the cost of having to store the data in the 
first place. It is not feasible for many organisations to suffer the 
cost of retaining all traffic indefinitely, but in some instances, where 
data is only kept for a matter of weeks, it may not be enough time 
for an effective response. Therefore log retention times can hinder 
investigation attempts. 
 
2. Type of log data collected: The type of data collected is also key 
to an effective investigation. Service providers may omit to collect 
the necessary metadata to validate an account.   
 
3. Account and data deletion: The removal of posted content can 
pose an issue, for example where an individual posts a message 
and then intentionally deletes it. If the victim has not made a record 
of the offending messages then law enforcement remain reliant on 
the service provider to have retained a copy of this content. The 
problem here is two-fold, where issues come from those who 
delete individual offending content, and/or, decide to delete the 
offending account. As with the problem of log retention noted 
above, storage space becomes an issue. Given the volume of 
traffic, it is unlikely that inactive content (i.e. deleted) will be 
retained for any substantial period of time or potentially at all. 
Therefore if the user choses to a) delete content and/or b) delete 
the offending account. Law enforcement are reliant on the service 
providers maintenance of retrievable content. In some cases, this 
may not be available.  
 
3 Taking a look at existing platforms 
This article has highlighted 22 social network, online communication and blogging websites 
in order to analyse their current account signup processes, terms and conditions and privacy 
policies in an attempt to assess the feasibility of tracking the physical users of offending 
accounts. These provision were chosen based on their popularity and having been 
highlighted as potentially problematic platforms by charities like the NSPCC (2016) and 
Childline (2016). 
 
The services analysed are:- 
 
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Instagram, Snapchat, Youtube, Reddit, ASKfm, Tumblr, Vine, 
Bebo, Quora, Flickr, Hi5, Pinterest, Buzzfeed, Badoo, Scribd, Wordpress, Foursquare, 
Vimeo and LinkedIn.  
 
3.1 Age of use  
As with most online services, the terms and conditions associated to each platform define 
the age a person must be before they can legally sign up for the service. From the 22 
services, 16 define this age as 13 years and above. Badoo, Hi5 and Buzzfeed identify this 
age as 18. LinkedIn specify age requirements specific to country of origin (13 years old for 
all countries except People's Republic of China, Netherlands, United States, Canada, 
Germany, Spain, Australia and South Korea). Finally Youtube and Vine state that users must 
be old enough to form a binding legal contract. Despite defining an age, similar to the issues 
with validating name information on account sign-up, there are no age validation procedures 
when a user creates their account (although many services (see Myspace (2016d) for 
example) will delete your account if they suspect you are not of an appropriate age) and 
therefore this information cannot be relied upon to support tying a physical individual to an 
account. This lack of validation is also potentially placing some population demographics at 
risk, particularly children. Nominet’s (2014) survey into child social media usage states that 
by ‘age 10, over half (59%) of children have used a social network’ in breach of platform 
terms and conditions. As a result, ‘21% of those surveyed stated they had posted negative 
comments by the average age of 11 and 43% had messaged strangers by an average age 
of 12’ (Nominet, 2014). Such concerns are exacerbated when it is considered that any form 
of inappropriate content targeted at a child may not be attributable to a physical offender, 
through a lack of traceability on these platforms.  
 
3.2 Sign-up process 
The account sign-up process for the 22 services highlighted in this article provides the first 
source of potentially useful information for tracking down an individual attributed to an 
offending account. When analysing the signup process it was found that all 22 services 
requested at least the name of the individual (full or first and last names), with no means of 
validating the accuracy of inputted content. All 22 services offered signup via an email 
address, with Twitter and Facebook offering a dual sign-up process of either email or mobile 
telephone number (verified via SMS message). Of the 22 services, only LinkedIn prevented 
users from using the service (successfully logging on) without first validating the email 
address used to signup for an account via sending a registration confirmation email to that 
account. As a result, the other 21 services could be accessed by supplying fake name 
details and a fake email address, providing that it was entered in the format of a legitimate 
email account provider. For tests within this article, a fake randomly generated email prefix 
string was added to ‘@gmail.com’ and successfully used to sign in. Although this may seem 
trivial, in reality it causes greater difficulty for law enforcement attempting to track individuals. 
Not only does it encourage the creation of trolling accounts as it can take seconds to 
generate an account on these platforms without the need to first create a valid email 
address, but it also lessens the chance of the user inputting identifiable content in the signup 
process. For example, where a valid, accessible email account is needed in order to activate 
an account on sign-up for any of the above social network services, in some cases an 
individual may opt to use their personal email address without contemplating the potential to 
be identified later, which may have been set up for legitimate purposes with accurate details 
(see Figure 1 for an example of how the use of an email service provider may also provide 
traceable information). At which point, a service provider may store a record the email 
address used at signup and attribute it to the offending account and therefore law 
enforcement may be able to contact to the email service provider for additional content.  
 
Figure 1. An overview of the signup process 
 
Yet the problem faced by social networks and the lack of validation of account sign-up 
details also exists with email service providers. This article also analysed the signup process 
at both Outlook and Google Mail in order to acquire an email address, arguably two of the 
most popular email service providers. Outlook requested that on sign-up, users provide a 
secondary backup email address and verification mobile number in addition to name, 
location and age data. The benefit here is that where a user must provide a mobile number 
to verify, providing a record of the number is kept, network service provider records may be 
queried in order to potentially identify the actual user of the account (subject to spoofing and 
pay-as-you-go numbers). Outlook requires this data before allowing the account to be 
created, however it accepted a number of ‘55555555555’ and a randomly generated email 
address, with the suffix ‘@gmail.com’. The problem this presents is that even though there is 
a requirement for what appears to be extra validation, it also cannot be relied upon. Similar 
processes were witnessed on the Google Mail platform.  
 
3.3 Terms, conditions and privacy 
Given the issues present on sign-up for the 22 services, offending tracking may be reliant on 
what was previously coined as metadata account validation in Section 2.1. To assess the 
feasibility of law enforcement achieving this, Table 1 presents a breakdown of the key 
inclusions in the terms of service and privacy policies of all 22 platforms, with a focus on IP 
log retention and account content and deletion procedures. 
 
Service Is IP info 
stored? 
How long is it 
retained? 
Key policy points of interest 
Facebook Yes Does not say. IP related information:- “When you delete IP content, it is deleted in       
recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that remove       
copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be available to ot     
 
Information around data deletion:- “Information associated with acc        
is deleted, unless we no longer need the data to provide products     
Accounts can be deactivated, essentially placing it in a suspended       
any time.  
 
When an account is deleted, the following are key points of interes      
deletion information (Facebook, 2016c):-  
● Deletion is delayed for a few days after it's requested. If you        
canceled. 
● Access can’t be regained once the account is deleted. 
● It may take up to 90 days to delete data stored in backup s      
on Facebook during this time. 
● Data related to an account may not be deleted. For exam       
from you after the account is deleted. 
● Copies of some material (ex: log records) may remain      
disassociated from personal identifiers. 
 
Additional retained device information:- “Attributes such as the ope     
device settings, file and software names and types, battery and sign      
Device locations, including specific geographic locations, such as      
signals. Connection information such as the name of your mobil       
language and timezone, mobile phone number and IP address” (Fac    
 
Users can self-disclosure account information and download their     
2016g). 
Twitter Yes Does not say.  IP related information:- “Given Twitter's real-time nature, some infor        
stored for a very brief period of time” (Twitter, 2016b). The privacy p      
data may be available for up to 18 months. 
 
Information around data deletion:- Users can deactivate their acco         
reinstate the account before permanent deletion. “After deactivation       
within a few minutes, however some content may be viewable on tw       
2016a). If the account is not reinstated after 30 days, Twitter will       
account, which can take up to 1 week (Twitter, 2016a). Some co       
engines beyond Twitter's control.  
 
Twitter’s ‘default is almost always to make the information you pro      
public for as long as you do not delete it’ (Twitter, 2016c). ‘Content      
Tweets) is generally not available’ (Twitter, 2016b). 
Instagram Yes Does not say. IP related information:- Given the volume of real-time content on     
only be stored for a short period of time (Instagram, 2016a). 
 
Information around data deletion:- Users have both the option to     
their account option (Instagram, 2016b). There is no indication on        
holder deletes individual content (photos etc). Instagram's privacy     
sign up details, analytics, log and device identifier content are reta         
stated. 
Myspace Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per the Myspace Privacy Po        
Account or delete information or Profile Content, copies of some      
Profile(s) may remain viewable in circumstances where, for exampl       
another User's Profile, shared information with a Third-Party Linke        
Member copied, stored or shared your information or has a copy of        
the Myspace Services. To the extent permitted by applicable l       
information related to your Account and associated Profile(s) o         
reasonably necessary after cancellation for fraud detection, site ope       
law or our internal security policies. Please be aware that, due to       
mobile technologies outside of our control, such as caching and ne     
may not be instantly inaccessible to others, and there may be        
information and content from elsewhere on the internet and from sea     
Foursquare Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per Foursquare’s privacy p        
maintain Foursquare, such deletion may not be immediate, and      
information or posts may remain on backup media for up to nine      
foregoing, we will retain information as required by applicable        
information that has already been aggregated or anonymized…. E      
from your account or profile, copies of that information may remain      
it has been shared with others, it was otherwise distributed pursuan         
copied or stored by other users. Removed and deleted information       
up to ninety (90) days prior to being deleted from our servers” (Four   
 
Device and account usage information (operating system, browser i    
Snapchat Yes Does not say Information around data deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy policy         
automatically delete the content of your Snaps (the photo and vid       
friends) from our servers after we detect that a Snap has been       
expired” (Snapchat, 2016a). In addition, the policy also acknowledg       
from the local device - “It’s also possible, as with any digital informa       
to access messages forensically or find them in a device’s temporar     
 
The period of time information exists before deletion depends on        
Snapchat:- 
● Snaps: Automatically deleted after they’ve been viewed      
typically cannot be retrieved from Snapchat's servers by a      
servers are designed to automatically delete unopened Sna     
● Chat messages: Automatically deleted after sender and rec        
of the Chat screen – unless either party presses and holds t    
● My Story: Automatically deleted 24 hours after each Snap is  
● Live Stories: Live Story or Local Story Snaps may be      
(Snapchat, 2016c). 
 
Information around account deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy p         
account, you will have up to 30 days to restore your account befor       
our servers. During this period of time, your account will not b      
(Snapchat, 2016a). 
Youtube Yes Does not say Myactivity.google.com and https://takeout.google.com provide a me      
on the Youtube platfomr (subject to the account user changing pro     
periods are not disclosed, the following example of content typically      
suitable authority is provided.  
 
‘Subpoena: 
● Subscriber registration information 
● Sign-in IP addresses and associated time stamps 
Court Order: 
● Video upload IP address and associated time stamp 
● Information obtainable with a subpoena 
Search Warrant: 
● Copy of a private video and associated video information 
● Private message content 
● Information obtainable with a subpoena or court order’ (Goo   
Reddit Yes Potentially 100 days 
(Reddit, 2016a) 
IP related information:- As per the privacy policy - “Except for the       
account, Reddit will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 day    
 
Information around account deletion:- “When you delete your accou        
to other users and disassociated from content you posted under tha      
that the posts, comments, and messages you submitted prior to       
visible to others, unless you delete such content” (Reddit, 2016a).  
ASKfm Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Where an account is deactiva       
able to restore the account and the whole of the profile within 12       
cannot guarantee that this will always be the case” (ASKfm, 2016a).  
 
In regards to closing an account, “once processed, profile data will b       
any questions to friends will be converted to anonymous questions      
will remain visible but will appear to be from an anonymous user)         
their account by logging back in for a period of 30 days after       
processed. At the end of that period the account will be deleted and       
to questions will be removed. We will delete the data as soon as rea      
cases limited types of data, including log files and backups, ma          
deleted” (ASKfm, 2016a). 
Tumblr Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:-  “Deleting an Account may       
have published from our systems, as caching of, backups of, copies       
Information may not be immediately removed. In addition, given the       
some of the public activity on your Account prior to deletion (such a        
remain stored on our servers and accessible to the public”. (Tumblr,  
Vine Yes Potentially up to 18 
months  
IP related information:- “If not already done earlier, we will either       
common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP add       
months” (Vine, 2016a). 
 
Information around account deletion:- “Disconnecting your Vine ac      
authorization to cross-post on your behalf or otherwise access       
information obtained from that connection (other than information       
such as profile information), which may take some time” (Vine, 2016  
Badoo Yes Does not say  Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivat        
period. If not restored in this time, an account will be permanently       
expiration of the deactivation period. “Information (such as contac         
longer timescale, by way of housekeeping on a periodic basis. Rem      
persist in backup copies for up to 30 days to enable restoration, bu         
the meantime” (Badoo, 2016a). 
Scribd Yes Does not say No information available.  
Wordpress Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “If you delete content, Autom       
remove it from WordPress.com, but you acknowledge that caching       
not be made immediately unavailable” (Wordpress, 2016a). 
Buzzfeed Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “All content submitted by you       
by us indefinitely, even after you terminate your account” (Buzzfeed   
Quora Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivate       
“Deleting your Quora account means that the following content will b       
profile including photos and bio, your answers, comments, blog     
messages. Questions you may have asked will remain, since qu      
owned, but will not be associated with your name publicly” (Quora, 2  
 
“Once you confirm, your account will be deactivated immediately a       
After this point, you’ll have 14 days to change your mind and reac       
Once the 14 day grace period has expired and your account has      
profile will no longer be publicly accessible. Older versions of your       
indefinitely by Quora in the form of backups or internal logs” (Quora   
Flickr Yes Does not say Flickr is a product of Yahoo and therefore information is acquired fro      
2016a). Following Yahoo’s Data Storage and Anonymisation policy    
 
● “Yahoo’s anonymisation policy applies only to search log da  
● Yahoo stores this data in an identifiable form for up to 18 mo  
● IP addresses within search user log data will be anonymise        
the time of collection.” 
 
Limited information is available regarding how deleted data/account    
Pinterest Yes  Does not say. Information around account deletion:- “Following termination or dea        
remove any User Content from Pinterest, we may retain your U      
reasonable period of time for backup, archival, or audit purposes. Fu      
may retain and continue to use, store, display, reproduce, re-pin      
perform, and distribute any of your User Content that other user       
Pinterest” (Pinterest, 2016a) 
Hi5 Yes Indefinitely “All personal information collected by hi5 in connection with your us         
Privacy Policy, including without limitation your name, location, e      
friend connections, messages, comments, login information, IP add        
by hi5 indefinitely” (Hi5, 2016a). 
Vimeo Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- “You may delete your accoun        
be deleted from the Vimeo Service if they remain inactive (i.e., the u         
period of at least six (6) months. Subscription accounts will re        
subscription term and any renewal term” (Vimeo, 2016a). 
LinkedIn Yes Potentially 7 days 
after account 
deletion, at which 
point logs are 
IP related information:- Potentially 7 days after account del       
depersonalized  (LinkedIn 2016a). However, LinkedIn’s law enforce     
there is a 24 month limit on IP information from law enforcement dat      
 
depersonalized  
(LinkedIn 2016a). 
Information around account deletion:- “We retain the personal in      
account is in existence or as needed to provide you services       
information even after you have closed your account if retention is     
with our legal obligations, meet regulatory requirements, resolve dis     
fraud and abuse, or enforce this Privacy Policy and our User Agreem  
 
If you close your account(s), your information will generally be rem       
hours. We generally delete closed account information and will      
backup information through the deletion process within 30 da      
personalize within 7 days (although we do maintain 30 days wort        
debugging, and site stability purposes only) by creating aggregate       
back to individuals” (LinkedIn 2016a). 
Bebo Unknown.  Nothing is stated in 
the Privacy Policy 
regarding IP address 
content (Bebo, 
2016a). 
Information around content deletion:- “If you or we remove your U      
your User Content for a commercially reasonable period of tim       
purposes. Furthermore, BEBO and other Users might retain and     
transmit, modify, re-arrange, and distribute any of your User      
transmitted on the App” (Bebo, 2016b). 
 
4 Discussion of regulations 
As can be seen within Table 1, the stance taken by social media platforms in regards to data 
deletion and retained information varies. To analyse this content, discussions are broken 
down into two areas, data deletion and IP information.  
 
4.1 The problem with deleting content 
Content on these platforms is volatile and often vulnerable to the original poster’s intentions 
to delete or keep any posted messages. As a result, police guidelines indicate that an 
individual should attempt to make record of any offending content  as soon as it is identified 
as it may be the only chance to capture a record of it (ACPO, 2012; Hampshire Police, n.d.; 
Westyorkshire Police, n.d.). The problem remains that even where content is identified or 
recorded by a victim, it could be removed at any point from the service in question, 
potentially before relevant metadata can be preserved for identification purposes. There is 
no consistent approach to deleted data in the 22 platforms analysed, and although guidance 
is provided around deleting an account, there is little guidance as to how deleted account 
content is handled or archived by service infrastructure. In relation to deleted account 
content, where an offender chooses to delete their actual account time is crucial to ensuring 
potential evidential data is retained. The problem here is that law enforcement must obtain 
the relevant legal authority to comply with the terms and conditions of the social network 
services before data can be disclosed and this process can be slow. This is compounded by 
the fact that there is no actual defined consistent period of retention from which law 
enforcement authorities can make an informed judgement as to the feasibility of requesting 
data from these services. This ambiguity within policies can cost both time and money, 
leading to unsatisfactory case outcomes, and provides an area in need of improvement and 
clarity. 
 
From the 22 platforms examined in this article, the following platforms provide guidance 
targeted at law enforcement:- Facebook (2016d), Pinterest (2016b), Twitter (2016b), 
Snapchat (2016b), Myspace (2016b), Tumblr (2016b), Instagram (2016a), ASKfm (2016b), 
Badoo (2016a), Youtube (Google, 2016), Reddit (2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Flickr (Yahoo, 
2016b), Foursquare (2016b) and Wordpress (2016). These guidelines aim to explain the 
processes involved in submitting a request for information. One of the key processes for 
supporting law enforcement when interacting with social network platforms is the 
preservation order, allowing potentially evidential account data to be stored (not disclosed), 
pending relevant legal authority. Here, requests can be made to preserve data in connection 
with an offence, providing the correct legal authority is obtained for future disclosure, where 
generally a 90 period of preservation is set (Brunty and Helenek, 2014). For example, 
Facebook will preserve account data for 90 once relevant legal requests have been made 
(Facebook, 2016d). A 90 day preservation period is also obtainable from Twitter (2016b), 
Tumblr (2016b), ASKfm (2016b), Reddit (2016b), Instagram (2016a), Foursquare (2016b), 
Flickr (Yahoo, 2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Snapchat (2016b) (one additional 90-day period of 
extension can be requested in addition, making a total of 180). Myspace (2016c) preserve 
account data for 180 days. Wordpress (2016b) preserve data for 45 days and Pinterest’s 
(2016b) law enforcement guidance does not define a period of preservation.  
 
Often, the preservation order must specify the boundaries of the request in terms of time and 
amount of information from a specific account (Sammons, 2015). A blanket request for 
information may not be suitable, placing emphasis on suitable recognisance around an event 
to ensure that evidential information is contained within the requested period. It must also be 
noted that many social networks inform the account holder subject to a preservation order 
once it has been submitted (Sammons, 2015). 
 
 
Many current investigations involve Social Networking Sites. It is imperative that early 
consideration is made around securing Social Networking Profiles that fall within the 
investigation. The best evidence is available from the service provider however they are 
often located outside of the UK and may or may not secure the content on the appropriate 
request via the force CSP/ISP SPOC. As such the investigator should always secure a copy 
of what is seen by them as this may be the only opportunity to secure this evidence before it 
changes.  ACPO!!!!- link in 
 
4.2 IP logs 
As highlighted previously, IP log information can be a key source of information for 
identifying offenders. However, none of the 22 platforms clearly define their log retention 
period. For example, Reddit states that ‘will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 
days’ (Reddit, 2016a) but does not indicate what IP information it retains and whether it 
stores it for at least 100 days before deletion, with Hi5 stating this information is kept 
indefinitely (Hi5, 2016a) and Bebo does not comment on the issue. From Table 1, it can be 
seen that a common stance is to indicate that IP logs are collected but to omit to determine a 
time frame. As with ambiguity surrounding account and content deletion policies, the lack of 
a determined and consistent stance on retention can be detrimental to law enforcement's 
ability to mount an effective investigation and in some circumstances may also deter an 
attempt in belief that the relevant information does not exist.     
 
4.2.1 Request method and extracted data formats 
Request methods and extracted data format Establishing levels of access and engagement 
with social media platforms by law enforcement is difficult. The procedures associated with 
making a request for data vary depending on the social media platform, with limited 
information available. Facebook operate a ‘Law Enforcement Online Request System’ 
accessible and authenticated through the use of a valid law enforcement email address (also 
used for their associated product Instagram (2017)) (Facebook, 2017). Instagram highlight 
that those who do not submit via the law enforcement portal (opting for mail or email), then 
longer response rates may be witnessed (Instagram (2016a)). This process should be 
compared with services such as Myspace who simply offer contact methods of fax, mail or 
email, directed towards an appropriate legal department (Myspace (2016c)). In addition, 
there is limited information available within available policy information on the platforms 
analysed to indicate expected request response times. Establishing the format which law 
enforcement will receive any retained data is also difficult to ascertain due to limited 
disclosure of information in policy information. Twitter (2016b) indicate that content will be 
provided in electronic format which can be opened using generic word processing software. 
Further, Google's ‘Takeout’ function allows standard users to download an archive of their 
data containing information relating to Google's various products, where the format of data 
varies depending on content (for example, contacts are provided in vCard form, Google 
Drive documents provided in Microsoft Office associated formats). Although not stated, a 
similar standard for extracted data may be adopted for law enforcement, but this would need 
to be established on a case by case basis. 
 
4.3 Location and cooperation 
Location has an impact on communication and cooperation with the provision in question. Of 
the 22 platforms analysed, 20 are based in the United States (US) and are governed by US 
law, with ASKfm is based in Dublin and Badoo in UK. Therefore those operating outside of 
these locations must seek cross-jurisdictional compliance with these organisations which 
may not in all circumstances be straightforward, and costly in terms of time and money. This 
can sometimes be achieved through Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), which ‘is a method of 
cooperation between states for obtaining assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
criminal offences. MLA is generally used for obtaining material that cannot be obtained on a 
police cooperation basis, particularly enquiries that require coercive means’ (Gov.uk, 2016). 
However, cooperation with social network provision is not guaranteed, a problem which has 
become a somewhat controversial matter of discussion in recent years, centering around 
arguments of freedom of speech, privacy and alleged government spying regimes. For 
example, The Select Committee on Communications (2014) indicated that recently, French 
authorities had to endure a lengthy court battle with Twitter for the disclosure of account 
details for those posting of anti-Semitic tweets. Twitter’s (2016e) Transparency Report 
surrounding received information requests, indicates that compliance can vary. The United 
Kingdom (UK), Japan and US form the 3 current biggest requesters of data from Twitter. 
From statistics reported from January to June 2016, information was supplied by Twitter in 
82% of requests from the US, 61% from Japan and 76% from the UK. When taken in 
context, 453 requests for information from the US were unsuccessful, 282 from Japan and 
151 from the UK. In comparison, Facebook’s (2016h) Government Request Report shows 
the US, India and UK to be the biggest requesters. From statistics reported from July to 
December 2015, information was supplied by Facebook in 81% of requests from the US, 
51% from India and 82% from UK. When taken in context, 3654 requests for information 
from the US were unsuccessful, 2724 from India and 754 from the UK. In these 
circumstances, potentially evidential information may have been withheld, potentially 
prohibiting an investigation.      
 
4.4 Recent developments in the United Kingdom: Investigatory Powers Act 2016  
With a focus on developments within the United Kingdom, the recent enactment of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and its potential impact on social media investigations must 
be 8 G. Horsman / Digital Investigation xxx (2017) 1e11 Please cite this article in press as: 
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Charter’, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA16) received royal assent on the 29th 
November 2016. Despite receiving criticism for implementing various powers considered by 
some as being for the purposes of mass surveillance through bulk data retention, the IPA16 
came into force on December 30th 2016 and its many powers include the facilitation of the 
preservation of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) for 12 months by telecommunications 
service. ICRs are defined under section 62(7) IPA16 as records of the visits made to online 
services and websites by a user, used to examine where a user has been online. This is 
elaborated by the Home Office's (2016a, p17) Communications Data Draft Code of Practice 
stating ‘an ICR will only identify the service that a customer has been using. It is not intended 
to show what a customer has been doing on that service’. Yet, the bulk maintenance of ICRs 
by Internet Service Providers may only provide limited assistance in social media 
investigations (by potentially determining if a user has accessed a particular platform) due to 
the fundamental limitations imposed by an ICR, particularly in relation to the user of mobile 
device social media applications. This was reported by Adrian Kennard (2015), Managing 
Director Internet Service Provider Andrews & Arnold Ltd to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill who stated that even ‘if the mobile provider was even able to tell 
that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the 
phone had been connected to twitter 24 h a day, and probably Facebook as well. This is 
because the very nature of messaging and social media applications is that they stay 
connected so that they can quickly alert you to messages, calls, or amusing cat videos, 
without any delay’. Despite this being an issue with retained service provider information, the 
IPA16s deliberately wide definition of ‘telecommunications service’ still may provide some 
assistance to law enforcement. The Home Office's (2016b, p6) Interception of 
Communications Draft Code of Practice indicates that ‘Internet based services such as web-
based email, messaging applications and cloud-based services are, therefore, covered by 
this definition’, where Smith (2016) indicates that social media services would be 
incorporated. In addition, the powers of the IPA16 extend to ‘an operator outside the UK who 
provides a telecommunications service to people in the UK, or controls a telecommunication 
system in the UK’ (Smith, 2016). Providers are under an obligation to take reasonable 
practicable steps to give effect to any served warrant (see section 43 IPA16), regardless of 
their geographical location (Stringer, 2017). Therefore powers under the IPA16 are 
potentially enforceable via injunction against foreign social media providers (noted previously 
in Section “Location and cooperation” in relation to geographical location of many providers) 
subject to potential conflict with any foreign jurisdictional conflict (Smith, 2016). In such 
instances, social media providers may be required not only to maintain information regarding 
accesses to their platforms, but in turn, disclose this information subject to the correct legal 
processes being followed. 
 
5 Concluding thoughts 
As shown above, there are two main areas which currently pose an issue in the regulation of 
social network crime, account validation and retention policies. First, account validation 
remains a clear issue and is unlikely to be addressed soon. Validated accounts would not 
only allow effective identification but also act as a deterrent to individuals as the perceived 
anonymity offered by the Internet is partially combatted. Yet as already highlighted, the 
processes needed to achieve this are unlikely to be favourably adopted by social network 
services. Second, data retention also remains an issue, and one which is likely going to get 
worse, largely due to the significant volumes of traffic witnessed across these platforms. At 
present, the task of retaining data is onerous and in absence of legal regulations forcing 
retention, the task of doing so is simply voluntary. Retaining all data indefinitely is not 
feasible and not necessarily needed, and to some extend, retention is already occurring. 
However, to improve current processes, clarity, transparency and consistency of retention 
processes is needed, an issue shown in Table 1. It is proposed that the global adoption of a 
single standard for retaining data in terms of length of time and type is required for all social 
network services, yet the feasibility of achieving this without legal regulation is debatable.  
 
Ideally, IP logs should be maintained for long enough for this information to support 
investigatory processes, yet arbitrarily defining a period of time is not effective. Instead, 
collaboration between platforms must take place with law enforcement organisations to 
ensure that the data is retained for long enough to cover the period from first reporting of a 
crime by a victim up until legal processes are suitably activated to secure the disclosure of 
information. Preservation orders (as discussed above) provide some support but it is 
necessary to scrutinise further whether the commonly define period of 90 days is long 
enough to meet the required standard for disclosure of information from the service in 
question. Transparency in data retention times may also serve as a deterrent to those 
utilising the platforms. Where clear guidance is given regarding how long user actions are 
maintained, there may be a greater chance of potential offenders not breaching regulations 
in fear of detection. Achieving satisfactory retention of data must be balanced against the 
right for privacy and freedom of speak, a debate which is likely to continue for some time. 
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